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Abstract. The Russian Imperial Army fought for the first time in the 
mountains in 1799, when Alexander Suvorov led his corps from Italy 
across the Swiss Alps to join the Russian forces at Zurich and expel the 
French Army from Switzerland. His soldiers were skilled professionals 
who had won an impressive series of battles in Italy against the French. 
Suvorov did not anticipate problems in the Alps, being convinced that 
he would easily sweep away the small French garrisons deployed on 
his way. Yet, because of inexperience in mountain warfare, Suvorov’s 
corps struggled against enormous strategic, tactical, and logistical chal-
lenges, lost half of its manpower and failed to attain its goals. The Swiss 
trek shows that mountain warfare defies amateurism, dilettantism and 
spontaneity. Even though mountains are located on the verges of Rus-
sia, the Russian and then Soviet armies ignored the peculiarities of 
mountain warfare and fought every new campaign in the mountains 
the same way they would fight on the plains, with predictably dire 
consequences.
Until the end of the 18th century the Russian Army had fought only on 
plains. The campaign against France in the Swiss Alps launched by Gen-
eral Alexander Suvorov in 1799 was Russia’s first action in the moun-
tains. As Clausewitz states, “Historical examples … provide the best kind 
of proof in the empirical sciences”, which “is particularly true about the 
art of war”; therefore, “the detailed presentation of a historical event … 
make[s] it possible to deduce a doctrine.”1 This article furnishes arguments 
1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 170, 171.
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in support of this idea and emphasises the value of historical examples for 
diversifying war practice. It reveals the scope of the strategic, tactical, and 
logistical challenges Suvorov faced in the Alps and shows the volume of 
data about actions in the mountains available to the Russian General Staff 
as a result of this experience. Knowledge distilled from combat reports 
and numerous memoirs and studies would have been sufficient to assess 
the peculiarities of mountain warfare and make first steps towards the 
development of its doctrine, most of which would have been valid even 
at present. The article also shows how field research can facilitate the 
critical assessment of data provided by primary and secondary sources. 
I walked along Suvorov’s entire route across the Swiss Alps, and this 
experiment allowed me to grasp some of the challenges experienced by 
soldiers, often imperceptible in combat records; it also helped me assess 
the credibility of the available sources, clarify ambiguous statements and 
dismiss some allegations; and as a result draw what I would argue are 
uniquely accurate charts most of which are published for the first time 
in this article. 
Context 
In 1792–1797, the French revolutionary armies repelled the invasions 
of several great powers; the First Coalition admitted its defeat by sign-
ing a series of peace treaties. However, a year later France demonstrated 
its ambitions for a far-reaching expansion by launching an expedition to 
Egypt and landing in Malta; France then exploited internal turmoil in 
Switzerland to occupy it. The European monarchs decided to put an end 
to the atheist troublemaker who challenged the entire order of Europe – 
the balance of power, the existing borders, the dominant ideologies and 
the established social systems. This challenge convinced these monarchs 
that “the revolutionary regime was simply insatiable and that its elimina-
tion by military means was the only solution”.2 By January 1799, Austria, 
Britain and Russia assembled the Second Coalition against France. They 
2 T. C. W. Blanning, The French Revolutionary Wars (London: Arnold, 1996), 228, 229.
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planned to expel the French Army from Switzerland in the following 
summer. 
The allied forces were split between a Russian corps of 27,116 men, 
commanded by Alexander Rimskij-Korsakov that had arrived recently 
to Zurich from Russia, and four Austrian formations, totalling 22,138 
men, that were scattered along a 150 kilometre-long crescent between 
the Walensee and the Rhine valley and were under the overall com-
Figure 1. Options examined by Suvorov on the eve of the Swiss Campaign. 
This and all the other maps are author’s original drawings
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mand of Field Marshal Friedrich von Hotze.3 The seven French divi-
sions in Switzerland, commanded by General André Masséna, num-
bered about 60,000 men.4 Before launching an offensive against the 
French, the allies had to fuse their forces.5 To compensate for the 
numerical superiority of the French, they decided to bring the Russian 
corps of 21,286 men6, deployed in Italy, to northern Switzerland across 
the Alps. This force, commanded by Suvorov, consisted of professional 
and battle-hardened soldiers who had scored several victories over the 
French. Suvorov was to meet the Austrians as his troops exited the Alps 
in Schwyz, and then the allies would march to Zurich to join Korsakov. 
He did not anticipate serious problems along this 150-kilometre route 
in mid-September. He soon learned that the “fog of uncertainty” was 
thicker and the “friction of war”7 more severe in the mountains than 
on the plains. 
Plan 
Suvorov planned to begin his march at Taverne, a Swiss town close to the 
Italian border. He considered three routes across the Alps (Figure 1). The 
shortest way to Korsakov began along a good road in the Ticino valley 
and then proceeded along a good pack trail that was, however, inacces-
sible to carts or artillery, across St. Gotthard Pass (2,106 m) into the Reuss 
valley. A good road led along the valley to Altdorf at Lake Lucerne. From 
there, Suvorov planned to march along either bank of the lake to Schwyz 
3 Dmitrij Miljutin (Милютин, Дмитрий), Istorija vojny 1799 goda meždu Rossiej i Franciej 
(Исто рия войны 1799 года между Россией и Францией) (St. Petersburg: Imperatorskaja Aka-
demija Nauk, 1857), vol. 3, 471. Phipps states that Korsakov’s corps had 29,463 soldiers, Ramsay 
Phipps, The Armies of the First French Republic (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1980), vol. 5, 127.
4 Phipps, The Armies of the First French Republic, vol. 5, 128, 129; M. Bogdanovič (Богданович, 
М.), Poxody Suvorova v Italii i Švejcarii (Походы Суворова в Италии и Швейцарии) (St. 
Petersburg: Voennaja tipografija, 1846), 152. 
5 V. Lopatin (Лопатин, В.), ed., A. V. Suvorov: Pis’ma (А. В. Суворов: Письма) (Moscow: 
Nauka, 1986), 731.
6 Miljutin, Istorija, vol. 3, 476.
7 Clausewitz, On War, 101, 119.
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or directly to Zurich.8 The second route, which crossed San Bernardino 
Pass, was longer. Although accessible to carts and artillery, it led to the 
Austrian allies, in eastern Switzerland, rather than to Korsakov.9 The third 
route, much longer but easier, led along Como Lake and Tyrol, again to 
the Austrian allies rather than to Korsakov. 
Suvorov chose the first route because he hurried to join Korsakov 
before the French could concentrate their forces against him. Suvorov 
knew that no French formations were deployed along the second and 
third routes, whereas two brigades of the French division commanded by 
General Claude Lecourbe, with a total strength of 8,000 to 8,500 men,10 
were scattered all the way between St. Gotthard and Altdorf along the first 
route. However, this did not worry Suvorov because his corps enjoyed an 
overwhelming numerical superiority, which was further enhanced by two 
Austrian brigades. One of them, with 4,000 to 4,500 men commanded by 
Gottfried Strauch, was to join his army at the beginning of the march, 
while the other, with a strength of 2,000 to 2,500 men commanded by 
Franz Auffenberg, was to come from the Rhine valley to Amsteg, halfway 
between St. Gotthard and Altdorf into the rear of the French defenders 
of St. Gotthard, thus facilitating Suvorov’s advance.11 Suvorov sent all of 
his artillery via the third route but acquired from Piedmont 25 small two-
pounder mountain guns that could be transported on horseback.12 
8 “Dispozicija A. V. Suvorova” – A. V. Suvorov, ed. G. Meščerjakov (Мещеряков, Г.) (Mos-
cow: Voennoe izdatel’stvo, 1953), 307.
9 Christopher Duffy, Eagles over the Alps: Suvorov in Italy and Switzerland (Chicago: The 
Emperor’s Press, 1999), 158, 159.
10 The total strength of Lecourbe’s division was about 11,800 men, but one brigade, com-
manded by Gabriel Molitor, stayed far away in the Linth valley and did not affect Suvorov’s 
advance to Schwyz, Miljutin, Istorija vojny, vol. 3, 473; von Reding-Biberegg (Рединг-Биберегг, 
фон), Poxod Suvorova čerez Švejcariju (Поход Суворова через Швейцарию) (St. Petersburg: 
T-vo hudožestvennoj pečati, 1902), 13, 14; Phipps, The Armies of the First French Republic, 
vol. 5, 129. 
11 Bogdanovič, Poxody Suvorova, 153; Miljutin, Istorija vojny, vol. 2, 202; Suvorov to Hotze, 
Linken and Korsakov (5 September 1799), ibid., vol. 3, 478; Hotze to Suvorov (10 September 
1799), ibid., vol. 3, 480; von Reding-Biberegg, Poxod Suvorova, 12. Phipps assesses the strength 
of Auffenberg’s brigade as 3,180 men, Phipps, The Armies of the First French Republic, vol. 5, 
142.
12 Nikolaj Grjazev, “Poxod Suvorova v 1799 g,” – Aleksandr Vasil’evič Suvorov (Александр 
Васильевич Суворов), ed. S. Semanov (C. Семанов) (Moscow: Russkij mir, 2000), 194; “Dis-
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Since this march was an impromptu decision, Suvorov had no time 
to study the region and acquire detailed maps. He and the Austrian com-
manders exchanged draft plans of their respective marches, but neither 
the Austrians nor Suvorov commented on the details of the drafts they 
received from their partner.13 Lieutenant-Colonel Franz von Weyrother 
commanded the Austrian staff officers attached to Suvorov; it was prob-
ably he who compiled the overall plan detailing the convergence of the 
allied forces in the Schwyz Canton. 
The French Royal Army had, on occasion, fought in the Alps since 
early modern era: during the War of the League of Cambrai in 1508–1516; 
the Italian War of 1521–1526; the Nine Years’ War in 1688–1697; and the 
War of the Austrian Succession of 1740–1748. The revolutionary Army of 
the Alps, raised by the French Convention in 1792, occupied the Duchy 
of Savoy in the same year, and most of Switzerland in 1798. As Clausewitz 
observes, “the French, who had [long] possessed these giants reaching to 
the skies and were quite familiar with these gorges, felt at home in this 
area.”14 In contrast, the Russian soldiers had never fought in high moun-
tains. Suvorov felt obliged to educate them about the operational theatre 
they were about to enter. His instructions, ambitiously called Manual on 
Mountain Warfare, were only four pages long and advanced several plati-
tudes: Suvorov informed the soldiers that the progress of supply trains 
along mountain trails could be slow, emphasised the importance of enve-
lopment as a major manoeuvre in the mountains, and called for occupa-
tion of the dominating heights. If the enemy had already occupied these 
heights, the Russians would have to attack them with cold steel.15 Armed 
with the Manual, Suvorov’s corps confidently headed towards the Alps. 
pozicija A. V. Suvorova,” 305, 306.
13 Miljutin, Istorija, vol. 2, 201, 202; Suvorov to Hotze, Linken and Korsakov (5 September 
1799), ibid., vol. 3, 477, 478.
14 Carl von Clausewitz (Клаузевиц, Карл фон), Švejcarskij poxod Suvorova (Швейцарский 
поход Суворова) (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel’stvo, 1939), 108.
15 A. Suvorov, “Pravila dlja voennyh dejstvij v gorah” (20 September 1799) – Istorija rossijsko-
avstrijskoj kampanii 1799 g. (История российско-австрийской кампании 1799 г.), Egor 
Fuchs (Егор Фукс) (St. Petersburg: Voennaja tipografija General’nogo Štaba, 1825–26), vol. 3, 
319–325. Russian historians grossly overestimate the value of these generalities: they claim 
that Suvorov “enriched military art … with the first manual on mountain warfare”, “devel-
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During the year of their deployment in the Swiss Alps, the French 
established food depots replenished by taxes imposed on the local popu-
lation. Since the French forces were dispersed in small units in the upper 
reaches of Ticino and along the Reuss valley, these taxes were bearable. 
The Russians, as other armies on the march during these times, had to 
reckon on small amount of supplies carried with them but mainly on 
 living off the land. They decided to take food for only seven days because 
they planned to cross the Alps in a week. Soldiers carried three days’ worth 
of rations in their knapsacks, and mules and horses hauled the remaining 
four days’ rations, as well as ammunition and mountain guns.16 No Rus-
sian officer was concerned that the soldiers had no clothes other than the 
summer uniforms they wore on the hot Italian plains. 
The Plan Implemented: Breakthrough
Suvorov and his troops arrived in Taverne on 15 September and on 21 
September his main forces began the Alpine trek.17 The Austrian brigade 
commanded by Strauch joined Suvorov the next day. The Austrians sug-
gested that Suvorov send one division around St. Gotthard via two passes, 
the highest of which, Oberalp Pass, was 2,046 metres.18 This division was 
to strike into the rear of the St. Gotthard defenders, thus facilitating the 
progress of the main forces. Suvorov followed this advice and detached 
the 6,000-strong division commanded by Andrej Rosenberg for this mis-
sion; the rest of his men marched along the main road to St. Gotthard 
(Figure 2). 
oped the strategy and tactics of mountain warfare”, and thus “opened a new aspect of mil-
itary theory,” L. Lešinskij, “Ital’janskij i Švejcarskij poxody Suvorova,” – Suvorovskij sbornik 
(Суворовский сборник), ed. A. Suhomlin (Сухомлин, А.) (Moscow: AN SSSR, 1951), 125, 
129; M. Al’tgovzen, “Polkovodčeskoe iskusstvo Suvorova v Šveicarskom poxode,” ibid., 151.
16 “Plan obščej ataki na vystupivšago v malye Švejcarskie kantony neprijatelja” (September 
1799), Istorija rossijsko-avstrijskoj kampanii, vol. 3, 482, 483.
17 All the dates mentioned in this article have been converted from the Julian calendar, used 
by Russian contemporaries, to the Gregorian calendar.
18 Colonel Strauch (no date), Miljutin, Istorija, vol. 3, 479.
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Dmitrij Miljutin, the Russian Minister of War from 1861 to 1881, 
argues plausibly that Suvorov “had no idea what horrible obstacles he 
would have to overcome along the St. Gotthard route”.19 The Alps were 
“terrifying mountain ridges”, wrote Suvorov. “Yawning abysses threa-
tened to swallow us at every step through this kingdom of horror. Pitch 
dark nights, relentless thunderstorms, pouring rains, dense clouds, 
roaring waterfalls, and rocks falling from the mountains magnified our 
trepidation.”20 This account, grossly inflating the mountain hazards on 
Suvorov’s way, shows that the sheer view of the mountains frightened 
Russian soldiers.21
When Suvorov and his men arrived at the foot of St. Gotthard on 
24 September, they found only two French battalions with 1,861 men 
defending it22 against his 19,500 Russian and Austrian soldiers. About 
1,900 French were deployed at the northern foot of the pass, 12 kilome-
tres away from its top, and at the neighbouring Oberalp Pass, which was 
another 10 kilometres away. A good but narrow trail traversed the steep 
slope towards St. Gotthard, with room enough only for a packed horse. 
The handful of French defenders, highly motivated revolutionary sol-
diers, knew the basics of mountain warfare and put up fierce resistance. 
The valley leading to St. Gotthard was so narrow that its entire length was 
exposed to musket fire from a dozen terraces towering over each other 
and offering a number of excellent defensive positions. The Russians did 
not even unpack their mountain artillery because the slopes leading to 
the pass were too steep.23 They attempted to dislodge the French with 
bayonet charges, in the spirit of Suvorov’s Manual, but a concerted bayo-
net charge was impossible on the steep slope. Since Suvorov had had no 
communication with Rosenberg’s division, which was supposed to strike 
19 Miljutin, Istorija, vol. 2, 201.
20 Suvorov, “Donesenie Suvorova Imperatoru Pavlu I” (14 October 1799) – Istorija, Fuchs, 
vol. 3, 388, 389.
21 Ja. Starkov (Я. Старков), Rasskazy starogo voina o Suvorove (Рассказы старoго воина о 
Суворове) (Moscow, Izdatel’stvo Moskvitjanina, 1847), vol. 2, 185.
22 Duffy, Eagles, 171. Reding-Biberegg states that only one French battalion initially defended 
St. Gotthard; it was reinforced much later by another battalion, Reding-Biberegg, Poxod Suvo-
rova, 35, 36. 
23 Grjazev, “Poxod Suvorova,” 197.
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Figure 2. The routes of Suvorov and his baggage train,  
September – October 1799
St. Gotthard’s defenders from the rear, and so had no idea where it was, he 
sent two columns of six and four battalions, commanded respectively by 
generals Petr Bagration and Mihail Baranovskij, to envelop the left flank 
of the French positions at St. Gotthard (Figure 3). The shallow envelop-
ment conducted by Bagration did force the French to leave the foot of the 
38 Alexander Statiev
pass and retreat to higher positions but did not solve the main problem: 
the French continued to block the way to the pass. While waiting for the 
second envelopment to bear fruit, Suvorov probed the French defences 
with several frontal attacks in violation of his own instructions about 
mountain warfare, which rejected such attacks in favour of envelopments. 
The Russians gradually pushed the French up the pass, but the advance 
of the Russian battalions, demoralised both by the staunch resistance and 
the unfamiliar environment, was slow;24 the French, who had been rein-
forced by a battalion from the northern side of the pass, retreated from 
one terrace to another, inflicting heavy casualties on the attackers with 
accurate musket and artillery fire.
Meanwhile, the four battalions commanded by Baranovskij were 
climbing the main Alpine ridge along a broad but steep trail, seeking to 
envelop the left flank of the French position.25 The trek was exhausting, 
and by the time Baranovskij’s force finally reached the highest French 
position at the southern slope of the pass,26 the main Russian forces had 
already begun attacking it, having lost 1,200 men, killed and wounded, in 
24 Duffy, Eagles, 175. Most Russian historians attribute the deep enveloping march to the van-
guard commanded by Bagration, Aleksej Šišov (Алексей Шишов), Suvorov: Generalissimus 
velikoj imperii (Суворов: генералиссимус великой империи) (Moscow, Olma-Press, 2005), 
396; I. Rostunov (И. Ростунов), Generalissimus Aleksandr Vasil’evič Suvorov (Генералиссимус 
Александр Васильевич Суворов) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1989), 456, 457; Nikolaj Orlov 
(Николай Орлов), Poxod Suvorova v 1799 godu (Поход Суворова в 1799 году) (St. Peters-
burg: Stoličnaja skoropečatnaja, 1898), 201; A. Petruševskij (А. Петрушевский), Generalis-
simus knjaz’ Suvorov (Генералиссимус князь Суворов) (St.Petersburg: RAN, 2005), 571. In 
fact, it was the column commanded by General Mihail Baranovskij from the division of Povalo-
Švejkovskij, Miljutin, Istorija, vol. 2, 212.
25 Suvorov, “Dispozicija dopolnitel’naja k ovladeniju” (23 September 1799) – Istorija, Fuchs, 
vol.  3, 336. According to Clausewitz, this climb “across a terrain believed to be absolutely 
unpassable” was “the most stunning feat undertaken during Suvorov’s campaign”, Clausewitz, 
Švejcarskij poxod, 108. This claim, picked up by Russian authors (Miljutin, Istorija, vol. 2, 217), 
is misleading: it is impossible to climb the steep slopes head-on from the village of Airolo at the 
foot of the pass, nor does it make any sense, because a dirt road, now called Old Canaria Trail, 
traverses the southern slopes of the main Alpine ridge, gently gaining height from Airolo and 
leading to the pass above the main valley where Suvorov’s army was making its way. No other 
opportunity to reach St. Gotthard from the east exists. It takes five hours to reach the pass from 
Airolo. Baranovskij certainly had local guides who led his unit along the Old Canaria Trail. 
26 Suvorov, “Donesenie Suvorova,” – Istorija, Fuchs, vol. 3, 393.
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Figure 3. Assault on St. Gotthard
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Russians 
French defences   
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the frontal assault.27 Baranovskij’s soldiers had no chance to engage the 
enemy because when they suddenly emerged above the French position, 
the surprised defenders hastily abandoned it. The next day, Suvorov’s 
corps descended into the Reuss valley.
At first, Suvorov believed that his army, rushing across the Alps with 
limited supplies, could not afford to take enemy prisoners. Captain Niko-
laj Grjazev described Suvorov’s initial policy: “As for enemy prisoners, we 
did not take them in this battle; the bayonets and [musket] butts relieved 
us of the burden of escorting them. Although such brutality contradicted 
27 Miljutin, Istorija, vol. 2, 217, 218; Duffy, Eagles, 175.
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humanist standards, the pursuit of our quest made us ignore this sacred 
duty and forced us to commit this horrible murder.”28 
Meanwhile, Rosenberg’s division, which had been sent into deep 
envelopment of St. Gotthard, advanced under steady pouring rain along 
a difficult mountain trail with many fords.29 On 24 September, the men 
climbed Oberalp Pass, where they ran into a French battalion blocking 
the way to the Reuss valley (Figure 4). The French, who had about 850 
soldiers against 6,000 Russians, offered stubborn resistance at a position 
around a lake squeezed by narrows at the top of the pass.30 Rosenberg sent 
two regiments along the high ground above the northern and southern 
banks of the lake to envelop both flanks of the French, while the rest of 
the division, supported effectively by mountain artillery, launched a fron-
tal assault. The envelopment along the northern bank failed because steep 
cliffs did not allow the Russians to bypass the French position, while the 
marsh in front of it frustrated a swift approach. However, the envelop-
ment along the southern bank succeeded after the regiment commanded 
by Mihail Miloradovič gained about 300 metres in elevation along a steep 
grassy slope and reached the top of the rocks towering over the lake. This 
helped them to dislodge the French from the pass; according to Russian 
estimates, probably inflated, the French lost 400 men killed, wounded, 
and taken prisoner.31 The Russian casualties were 150 men killed and 
gravely wounded.32 
The Russians drove the remnants of the French defending the right 
flank of their position to cliffs that seemed impassable, but the French 
escaped the trap, running down the cliffs “like goats, without slipping; 
only a few of them fell from the steep slopes.”33 A Russian witness attri-
buted this escape to the crampons worn by the French and left a cre-
dible description of the crampons. This was perhaps the first use of cram-
28 Grjazev, “Poxod Suvorova,” 198.
29 Starkov, Rasskazy, vol. 2, 190.
30 Duffy, Eagles, 171, 181. Another French battalion stayed in Andermatt, a town close to the 
western foot of the pass.
31 Suvorov, “Donesenie Suvorova,” 401-403; Bogdanovič, Poxody Suvorova, 167.
32 Starkov, Rasskazy, vol. 2, 195.
33 Miljutin, Istorija, vol. 3, 495, 496; Starkov, Rasskazy, vol. 2, 206.
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pons in combat ever recorded.34 Rosenberg’s division descended into the 
Reuss valley only two kilometres downstream from Suvorov’s forces, thus 
blocking the retreat of the French defenders of St. Gotthard down Reuss 
and forcing them to march upstream and then across a pass to the Rhône 
valley. In order to secure the rear of his army from possible attacks, Suvo-
rov had to leave Strauch’s brigade at the northern foot of St. Gotthard.35 
On the next day, 25 September, Rosenberg joined the main forces. His 
deep envelopment, slowed down by logistical constraints, did not help 
Suvorov’s assault on St. Gotthard, nor did it trap the French defenders – 
its two primary missions – but it did prompt them to leave the Reuss 
34 According to Clausewitz, when Baranovskij’s force climbed the Alpine ridge, it used cram-
pons “manufactured by Austrians in large numbers especially for this purpose,” Clausewitz, 
Švejcarskij poxod, 108. However, no Russian contemporary source mentions crampons used by 
Suvorov’s soldiers, Miljutin, Istorija, vol. 3, 495, 496. The Russians could hardly have carried 
2,000 pairs of heavy crampons with them when they had limited their food rations below the bare 
minimum, and the Austrians had no time to manufacture them “especially for this purpose”.
35 Miljutin, Istorija, vol. 3, 478.
Figure 4. Assault on Oberalp
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valley and thus made them irrelevant for the rest of the campaign. The 
Russians sustained 2,000 total casualties in battles at St. Gotthard and 
Oberalp36 – many more than the French. 
The next obstacle Suvorov had to overcome was Urnerloch, a 
70-metre-long tunnel cut in the rock forming the eastern side of the 
narrow and deep Reuss gorge (Figure 5). The tunnel ended at a small 
terrace above a bridge called Teufelsbrücke (Devil’s Bridge), where the 
road crossed the gorge to the western bank of the river. The remnants of 
the French Oberalp garrison, reinforced by several battalions that had 
come upstream from Altdorf, gathered near Teufelsbrücke and Urner-
loch, planning to block the only way down the Reuss. However, on 25 
September, the day when Suvorov’s army was approaching Urnerloch, 
an Austrian brigade commanded by Franz Auffenberg crossed Kreuzli 
Pass (2,347 m) from the upper Rhine into the Reuss valley and descended 
to Amsteg into the rear of the French defenders.37 Although the French 
 easily beat off the Austrian attack, they decided to abandon the position at 
Teufelsbrücke and retreat to Altdorf to avoid a possible entrapment. They 
left only a small rear-guard at the bridge. The events developed so quickly 
that the rear-guard could only damage but not destroy the massive bridge 
across the deep gorge behind their retreating forces. The Russians pushed 
through Urnerloch and Teufelsbrücke, but witnesses’ descriptions and 
historians’ interpretations of these incidents are strikingly different. 
Suvorov’s account – subsequently dramatized even further by Russian 
authors – presented the crossing of Teufelsbrücke as similar to Napoleon’s 
attack on the Bridge of Arcole, which had happened only three years ear-
lier. According to these authors, the Russian vanguard rushing through 
the Urnerloch tunnel was suddenly hit by grapeshot from a French gun 
positioned at the tunnel’s exit and by musket fire from two French bat-
talions defending Urnerloch and Teufelsbrücke: “Behind every rock, all 
along the trail, down at the river and up in the mountains – everywhere 
were muskets delivering accurate fire.”38 On seeing that the attack through 
36 Miljutin, Istorija, vol. 2, 222.
37 Ibid., 228.
38 Ibid., 227; Rostunov, Generalissimus, 458.
43The Alpine Campaign of 1799 as a Stepping Stone to a Doctrine of Mountain Warfare
the tunnel was impossible, Russian commanders sent 300 musketeers 
over the rocks of the eastern bank above Urnerloch and a Jäger battalion 
across the Reuss to its western bank. The battalion forded the 1.5 metre-
deep river, struggling against a strong current, and climbed up steep 
rocks, thus coming to the top of a cliff above and across the river from 
the small terrace at the exit of Urnerloch.39 They could not descend the 
vertical cliff, but they drove away the French defenders from the terrace 
at the exit of Urnerloch below them with rifle fire, while the musketeers 
39 Bogdanovič, Poxody Suvorova, 170; Petruševskij, Generalissimus, 576.
Figure 5. Assault on Teufelsbrücke
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above Urnerloch shot at the bridge defenders below. When the Russian 
vanguard reached the bridge and found that it was damaged, the soldiers 
used officers’ sashes, in the absence of ropes, to tie together several logs 
the French had taken off the bridge. They threw the logs across the gap 
in the bridge’s damaged section, after which the French retreated, losing 
280 men in the engagement.40 
Other eyewitnesses and authors dismiss this story.41 Clausewitz 
believed that Urnerloch and Teufelsbrücke “were defended by very weak 
forces or had almost no defenders” and assesses their maximum strength 
as one company.42 The French apparently damaged not the bridge itself 
but only the access to it. Grjazev provides a different description of the 
Teufelsbrücke crossing; he calls his narrative unexciting but says that it 
reflects “the events without any inventions and omissions”. He acknow-
ledges that the Russians were depressed while moving through Urner-
loch, as if they “were entering hell”, but denies that they met opposi-
tion either in Urnerloch or at Teufelsbrücke.43 In any case, if the French 
40 Suvorov, “Donesenie Suvorova”, 389, 402–406; Miljutin, Istorija, vol. 2, 224, 227, 228; Bog-
da novič, Poxody Suvorova, 170; Šišov, Suvorov, 398, 399; Rostunov, Generalissimus, 460; Petru-
ševskij, Generalissimus, 577.
41 Duffy, Eagles, 189. Even Miljutin questions Suvorov’s entire report about the Swiss cam-
paign and admits that it describes events “very vaguely and superficially,” Miljutin, Istorija, 
vol. 3, 492, 497, 498. Miljutin suspects that it was perhaps Egor Fuchs, Suvorov’s secretary, who 
produced the romanticised version of the Teufelsbrücke crossing. Yet Miljutin still offers this 
version as a fact. No eyewitnesses mention artillery staying at Urnerloch, and as is clear from 
Suvorov’s report, the episode with the gun firing grapeshot at the Russians advancing along a 
narrow trail towards the bridge happened not at Teufelsbrücke but at another bridge near Alt-
dorf. Suvorov, “Donesenie Suvorova,” 407. The terrace at the exit of Urnerloch is so small that it 
could accommodate only perhaps two platoons rather than two battalions, and the exit of Urn-
erloch is invisible from any other place. The sketch drawn by Russian contemporaries shows 
only French pickets on the western side of the river rather than two battalions, Duffy, Eagles, 
189. No doubt, most of the French forces left Teufelsbrücke before the emergence of Suvorov’s 
vanguard to avoid a possible entrapment by Auffenberg, and a small rearguard had to retreat 
as soon as the Jägers outmanoeuvred it. The story about musketeers climbing above Urnerloch 
along the rocks of the eastern bank is an obvious misinformation because it would be impos-
sible to climb those vertical rocks; the musketeers mentioned in primary sources could only 
climb the 20-metre-high rocky bump after they had exited Urnerloch.
42 Clausewitz, Švejcarskij poxod, 113.
43 Grjazev refers sarcastically to the romanticised version of the story: “As to our crossing of 
the miraculous Teufelsbrücke, the inventive genius of mankind displayed a vivid imagination 
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offered even a token resistance in the tunnel, the Jägers’ march across 
the Reuss and around Urnerloch must have played a crucial role in 
breaking it.44 
Having crossed Teufelsbrücke, Suvorov’s army marched down the 
Reuss, sweeping away small French rear guards that attempted to delay 
its advance (Figure 6). On 26 September, Suvorov, joined by Auffenberg’s 
brigade, reached Altdorf, near the southern shore of Lake Lucerne and 
on the eastern bank of the Reuss. Lecourbe moved most units of his two 
brigades, which by this time totalled 5,000 to 6,000 men,45 to the western 
bank, destroyed all the bridges across the river, and spread his forces all 
along the Reuss to prevent the Russians from restoring the bridges.46 Only 
700 to 900 men were left to oppose Suvorov at Altdorf,47 and the Russians 
easily drove them out of town. 
The Plan Amended: Friction of War
With only 17 kilometres now separating Suvorov from the town of 
Schwyz at the edge of the Alps, the rendezvous point with the Austrians, 
he found that the road he had planned to take to reach Schwyz ended at 
and presented a colourful picture to our sovereign: it was claimed … that the officers … tied 
together partially burned logs with their sashes. I myself was a participant in this crossing, and 
our regiment was always at the vanguard, but I did not see it. Men sent in advance fixed the 
partially burned logs and boards and added new ones, and it was possible to cross with due 
caution,” Grjazev, “Poxod Suvorova,” 201. Grjazev was, however, in the vanguard of the main 
forces, while other eyewitnesses state that it was Rosenberg’s division that took the bridge, 
Starkov, Rasskazy, vol.  2, 198. The fact that Suvorov was asleep during the “assault” on the 
bridge indirectly supports Grjazev’s version and suggests that no serious engagement took 
place there, Duffy, Eagles, 193.
44 Teufelsbrücke was a poor position: as soon as Russians exited Urnerloch, the defence of the 
bridge was untenable because its garrison would have found itself at a narrow road carved in 
the vertical rock exposed to fire from high ground on the opposite side. It was at Urnerloch 
rather than Teufelsbrücke where the French could have attempted to pin the Russians down, 
but as soon as Russian Jägers forded the river and climbed the rocks towering over the exit of 
the Urnerloch, its defenders had to retreat. 
45 Clausewitz, Švejcarskij poxod, 116.
46 Duffy, Eagles, 198.
47 von Reding-Biberegg, Poxod Suvorova, 41.
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Flüelen, a village just north of Altdorf on the eastern shore of the lake. 
High vertical cliffs emerged straight from the water on both sides of 
the lake, precluding any opportunity to climb them and go north along 
either side.48
Even before Suvorov had entered Switzerland, Ferdinand de Roverea, 
a Swiss colonel, had warned the Russians that the only way from Alt-
dorf to Schwyz would be via Chinzig Chulm Pass (2,073 m) along a dif-
ficult trail into the Muota valley, which leads to Schwyz.49 When Suvorov 
was approaching Altdorf, he may still have hoped to find a path along 
Lake Lucerne, but when it turned out that none existed, he was ready for 
this worst-case scenario and ordered his army to march across Chinzig 
Chulm. Suvorov left Rosenberg’s division at Altdorf as rear guard to pro-
tect the passage of the supply train from attacks of Lecourbe’s forces and 
then to march behind the train. 
The soldiers spent 12 hours covering the 16 kilometres across the 
pass. The vanguard began the ascent on 27 September, but it took the 
entire army, including the slow supply train, four days to reach the Muo-
ta.50 The Russian reports of the march across the Chinzig Chulm maintain 
that “every misstep threatened death”;51 “many unfortunates died on this 
torturous way: some from cold, exhaustion, or starvation; many others 
48 von Reding-Biberegg, Poxod Suvorova, 39. Numerous Russian allegations that the Austrians 
misled Suvorov by telling him about “a narrow path” leading from Altdorf to Schwyz along 
the eastern bank of Lake Lucerne are false, Lopatin, Suvorov, 732; Rostunov, Generalissimus, 
461, 462; Leščinskij, “Ital’janskij i Švejcarskij poxody,” 124; L. Beskrovnyj, “Strategija i taktika 
Suvorova,” – Suhomlin, Suvorovskij sbornik, 39; Šišov, Suvorov, 393. Miljutin and other Russian 
historians who imply Austrian treason give no evidence to back their speculations. In fact, 
the allegation that the Austrians mentioned “a narrow path” comes only from Hotze’s letter 
to Suvorov on the eve of the campaign, in which he simply wrote that Auffenberg rather than 
Suvorov would “follow a narrow path to Schwyz Canton to join me there,” Hotze to Suvorov 
(10 September 1799), Miljutin, Istorija, vol. 3, 480. He said neither that this path went along 
the lake’s bank nor that it led to the town of Schwyz; he meant only that there was a path to the 
Schwyz Canton. Such a path did indeed exist across the Chinzig Chulm pass. Both Suvorov 
and Weyrother may have misinterpreted this incidental remark as a statement that the path led 
from Altdorf to Schwyz along the lake’s eastern bank. In the end, Suvorov took the trail sug-
gested by Hotze for Auffenberg’s brigade.
49 Duffy, Eagles, 160, 161.
50 Miljutin, Istorija, vol. 2, 233, 235.
51 Petruševskij, Generalissimus, 583.
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Figure 6. Suvorov’s march from St. Gotthard to Pragel
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fell from the cliffs and met a horrible death in the abysses.”52 In fact, the 
trail to the pass is muddy and slippery but absolutely safe; stepping into 
a cow pat is the greatest danger that a trekker may encounter during the 
crossing of Chinzig Chulm.53 It was not so much the actual difficulty of 
the trek as its perception by the soldiers – strangers to the mountains, 
weakened by malnourishment, and exhausted by a long march – that was 
responsible for the overdramatised tales. Many had to spend a night at 
the pass above treeline, exposed to icy wind and rain and shivering in 
their soaked summer uniforms around tiny smouldering fires set from 
the boards of a demolished barn,54 and many must have caught cold as 
a result. After descending from the pass, freezing soldiers warmed up by 
burning any wood they could find in the first village in the Mouta valley – 
fences, barn doors, and the hardwood floors of homes.55
Suvorov knew that mountain regions were sparsely populated and 
that it would be impossible to requisition anything but hay.56 The sol-
diers had already consumed all the rations in their knapsacks by the time 
they reached Altdorf, and most of their supply train lagged several days 
behind. Since Suvorov was already one day behind schedule when he 
arrived in Altdorf57 and would be delayed even further for his rendez-
vous with the Austrians at Schwyz, he left for the Muota valley without 
waiting for the supply train. Rusks carried by those few mules that could 
52 Miljutin, Istorija, vol. 2, 230. According to the Russian authors, the steep snow-covered path 
went over high cliffs, and the trail “at this time of the year was accessible only to courageous 
hunters accustomed to climb huge cliffs and remote icefields,” ibid; Al’tgovzen, “Polkovodčeskoe 
iskusstvo,” 146. However, in reality, no icefield existed at Chinzig Chulm; eyewitnesses mention 
extreme fatigue, thunderstorms, and cold winds but no snow on the way to the Muota. 
53 Having retraced Suvorov’s route in the late nineteenth century, Rudolf von Reding-Biberegg, 
lieutenant-colonel of the Swiss General Staff, found that Russian authors “grossly inflate the dif-
ficulty of the march. They write about yawning abysses into which horses and riders were fall-
ing, horrible gorges, … terrifying rocks and paths at dizzying heights. Anyone who has walked 
across the pass knows that in reality, … troops could easily and safely cross it, even with horses 
unaccustomed to the mountains. The best proof of this is the fact that [the local] residents … 
have been driving horses and cattle across the pass for ages,” von Reding-Biberegg, Poxod Suvo-
rova, 54, 55. I can confirm that Reding-Biberegg’s statement is correct.
54 Starkov, Rasskazy, vol. 2, 205.
55 von Reding-Biberegg, Poxod Suvorova, 56, 137.
56 Ibid., 134.
57 Miljutin, Istorija, vol. 2, 232.
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keep up with the army got wet under frequent rains and rotted. Many 
pack animals died from exhaustion on the way to the Muota. Many others 
lost their horseshoes on the granite rocks and moved slowly, overcoming 
pain. Because of the slow progress of the supply train and its rapid attri-
tion, soldiers’ rations were cut after St. Gotthard. They began to suffer 
from malnourishment during the march to the Muota. Grjazev describes 
how they chewed roots they had dug. “Meat was so scarce,” he writes, 
“that we were forced to eat such [animal] parts that, at another time, we 
would have regarded as disgusting; even the cattle hide was used: we cut 
it up in small pieces, burned the hair over fire after putting it [the hide] on 
ramrods, grilled it [mainly] in our imagination, and ate it half-raw.”58 Sol-
diers were so hungry that when they dug potatoes from the fields of local 
farmers, they could not wait until they were cooked and ate them raw. 
They slaughtered farmers’ cattle and ate raw meat; they also ate candles in 
churches and picked all the fruit they could find, whether ripe or not.59 It 
was still possible to buy cheese from the Swiss but soldiers perceived blue 
cheese as rotten and did not eat it.60 
During these unanticipated lengthy, rainy marches along poor trails 
in high mountains, soldiers began grumbling about Suvorov, “the old 
man” who “has lost his marbles and has brought us God knows where”.61 
When Suvorov heard this muttering, he tried to boost morale with jokes, 
eccentric manners, and charismatic rhetoric, calling his soldiers “invin-
cible giants” (čudo-bogatyri).62 When flamboyant rhetoric was insufficient 
to maintain discipline, Russian officers restored it with drastic measures. 
Maksim Rehbinder, a regiment commander, ordered soldiers to “bayonet 
the cowards and throw them like scabby sheep out of the flock: cowards 
can ruin the battle, they are as contagious as plague.”63 Suvorov’s methods 
of morale maintenance, however, still leaned to carrot rather than stick, 
and they proved to be adequate for this brief campaign. 
58 Grjazev, “Poxod Suvorova,” 204, 205.
59 Lopatin, Suvorov, 520.
60 Grjazev, “Poxod Suvorova,” 205; Petruševskij, Generalissimus, 582.
61 Miljutin, Istorija, vol. 2, 309.
62 Starkov, Rasskazy, vol. 2, 256.
63 Ibid., 223.
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Having descended to the Muota on 28 September, Suvorov learned 
that on 25 and 26 September, Masséna had crushed Korsakov’s corps, 
killing, wounding, and taking prisoner 8,000 of its 27,000 soldiers, after 
which the Russians had fled in disorder to the German frontier.64 This 
defeat made Suvorov’s march westwards to Schwyz, where Massena was 
now assembling his main forces, pointless and dangerous.65 Suvorov 
began to contemplate advancing in the opposite, eastern direction via 
the low Pragel Pass (1,550 m) into the Linth valley, towards the Austrian 
allies, but he discovered that the French general Jean-de-Dieu Soult had 
defeated Hotze, who was attempting to link with Suvorov. Soult’s divi-
sion, available now for actions against Suvorov, stayed close to the mouth 
of the Linth River near the northern exit from the Alps, and a part of 
the French brigade commanded by Gabriel Molitor blocked Pragel and 
the eastern exit from the Muota valley; Lecourbe’s brigades pursuing 
Suvorov’s rearguard sealed the Chinzig Chulm trail, blocking the way to 
retreat. Suvorov realised that his entire march across the Alps had been 
futile and that his army was in a mousetrap, surrounded in the Muota 
valley. At the military council called on 29 September, Suvorov deli-
vered a fiery speech that worked his officers up into frenzy. As Bagra-
tion recalled, “I was … in such a euphoric mood that even if myriads of 
enemies attacked us, I would have been ready to fight them. … Everyone 
felt the same.”66 Suvorov decided to break through Pragel and then to the 
northern exit from the Alps at the mouth of the Linth, in the hope of join-
ing the Austrian formations still present in the region.67 After the arrival 
of the supply train and some requisitions, Suvorov’s army had food for 
64 Duffy, Eagles, 220. 
65 Suvorov – and after him, most Russian historians – stated that the five-day delay in  Taverne, 
where the Russians waited for the Austrian-provided mule train, was fatal because  Suvorov 
could not join Korsakov at Zurich before Massena attacked and routed him, Lopatin, Suvo-
rov, 730; Miljutin, Istorija, vol.  2, 280; Petruševskij, Generalissimus, 586. In fact, Suvorov 
would have been too late anyway because he found that the exit from the Muota valley to 
Schwyz was blocked by Mortier, and his rearguard came to Muotathal village, which was 74 
kilometres from Zurich, only in the late afternoon of 30 September, Miljutin, Istorija, vol. 2, 
277, 290.
66 Lopatin, Suvorov, 733.
67 Miljutin, Istorija, vol. 3, 513.
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five days. The council decided to cut soldiers’ rations by half to extend 
them to 10 days.68 
The next day, 30 September, Suvorov began advancing towards Pra-
gel, leaving Rosenberg’s division as rear guard to cover the march from 
a French division commanded by Edouard Mortier that was expected 
to attack from Schwyz.69 A part of Gabriel Molitor’s brigade, numbering 
3,500 men,70 offered stubborn resistance at Pragel to Suvorov’s vanguard 
of 4,200 Russians and Austrians,71 which continued into the next day, 
1 October. At the end of the first day of fighting, the French had to retreat 
beyond Klöntaler Lake and blocked the only trail, carved into the cliffs 
that make up the lake’s northern bank (Figure 7). The French brigade 
pinned the Russians down with musket and artillery fire at this position, 
which seemed impregnable. Russian mountain guns were too short range 
and small calibre to engage effectively the French field artillery deployed 
at the plateau behind the narrows.72 The Russians spent the night near the 
lake in the open, shivering under the rain and unable to sleep.73 But they 
sent two regiments above the rocks that form the northern bank of the 
lake and another regiment along its southern bank to envelop the French 
position from both flanks.74 The southern envelopment failed because a 
high cliff bordering the lake descended straight into the water, but the 
exhausting night march to the high point on the northern bank, during 
which the two regiments had to climb several hundred vertical metres 
through thick wet woods, brought the soldiers above and behind the 
French position. The next day, when Russian reinforcements arrived at 
Klöntaler Lake from Pragel and the French also received some reinforce-
ments, the Russians launched an attack, combining a frontal assault along 
the trail blocked by the French with a strike from the rocks above the 
French position. The offensive began before dawn, and soldiers attacking 
68 Miljutin, Istorija, vol. 3, 513.
69 Lopatin, Suvorov, 359.
70 Miljutin, Istorija, vol. 2, 284. Phipps assesses the strength of Molitor’s formation at this time 
as 2,599 men, Phipps, The Armies of the First French Republic, vol. 5, 153.
71 Duffy, Eagles, 226.
72 Grjazev, “Poxod Suvorova,” 211.
73 Miljutin, Istorija, vol. 2, 289.
74 Duffy, Eagles, 229.
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from the rocks above could not see their way; some of them fell from the 
cliffs to their death.75 They still suffered lighter casualties than those who 
participated in the frontal assault. Grjazev was among the latter, and he 
recorded that “the whole narrow trail, especially the stretch that exited to 
the plateau, was covered with the bodies of our men to such an extent that 
it became impassable. With broken hearts, we had to throw them into 
the lake to free our way and then stepped on piles of the bodies of our 
comrades to break through to the plateau.”76 But the flank attack forced 
the French to abandon their position and retreat down to the Linth valley. 
Meanwhile, on 30 September, a French division commanded first by 
Mortier and then by Masséna came up the Muota and engaged Rosen-
berg’s rear guard. During this and the next day, the rear guard, with about 
8,000 men engaged the French forces, which totalled 9,000 to 10,000 
men.77 After several frontal attacks on the French positions failed, on 
1 October a Russian envelopment march across a forest along the foot of 
the mountains that formed the northern side of the Muota valley78 sur-
prised the French and facilitated a frontal attack that ended in the rout of 
the French. Many fleeing French soldiers plunged to their deaths during 
the stampede at the narrow bridge over the Muota River. The French lost 
about 2,000 men killed, wounded, or taken prisoner, whereas the Russian 
losses were 500 to 600 men wounded and an unknown number killed.79 
By gaining this victory, Rosenberg shook Masséna off Suvorov’s tail and 
followed the rest of the army across Pragel. 
Having realised that his corps, burdened with many wounded and 
sick soldiers, would be unable to move quickly across the mountains, 
Suvorov ordered Rosenberg to leave 600 of the wounded and sick, along 
with 1,000 French wounded prisoners, in the Muota valley with a let-
ter to Masséna in which Suvorov stated that the Russian wounded were 
75 Miljutin, Istorija, vol. 2, 282, 295.
76 Grjazev, “Poxod Suvorova,” 212.
77 von Reding-Biberegg, Poxod Suvorova, 81, 84; Philip Longworth, The Art of Victory (Lon-
don: Constable, 1965), 284. According to Phipps, this French division had 7,800 men. Phipps, 
The Armies of the First French Republic, vol. 5, 149. 
78 Miljutin, Istorija, vol. 2, 293.
79 Suvorov to Emperor Franz II (11 October 1799) – Istorija, Fuchs, vol. 3, 382; von Reding-
Biberegg, Poxod Suvorova, 95.
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entrusted to “the humane protection of the French”.80 It was a bold request 
after the slaughter of all the French who had attempted to surrender at St. 
Gotthard. Yet the French treated the prisoners humanely and provided 
medical care.81 
After arriving in the Linth valley, Suvorov pursued the French down 
the Linth River to Näfels, a town located at the exit from the Alps, where 
the French made a stand, blocking the valley on both riverbanks and 
thus making envelopments impossible. The Russian vanguard and the 
remnants of Molitor’s brigade were of equal strength,82 but the Russian 
mountain guns again could not match the French field artillery. In the 
battle on 1 October, Näfels changed hands several times in a bitter fight 
80 Duffy, Eagles, 242; Miljutin, Istorija, vol. 2, 298; vol. 3, 520.
81 Starkov, Rasskazy, vol. 2, 273.
82 Miljutin, Istorija, vol. 3, 518; Duffy, Eagles, 241. Phipps states that at that moment 4,700 French 
soldiers faced about 7,000 Russians, Phipps, The Armies of the First French Republic, vol. 5, 156. 
Figure 7. Breakthrough along the Klöntaler Lake and the debacle at Näfels 
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but in the end, the Russians exhausted their ammunition and could not 
break through. Given the presence of Soult’s division nearby, the inferio-
rity of the Russian artillery, the lack of ammunition, and the pressure of 
the Grand Prince Constantine, who travelled with Suvorov as a tourist, 
the military council that was called the next day decided to abandon the 
attempts to break through and to retreat via the high Panix Pass (2,407 
m) into the Rhine valley, which was held by the Austrians.83 Although all 
earlier engagements in the Swiss campaign ended with Russian victories, 
the failure to break out of the Alps at Näfels was a strategic defeat that 
nullified all those victories because it was the last nail in the coffin of the 
strategic plan that presumed the cooperation of the allied forces in Swit-
zerland.84 Before marching to Panix, the Russians again left 400 of their 
sick and wounded soldiers at the mercy of the French, with the written 
plea to spare them.85 
The Plan Scrapped: Retreat 
On 5 October, after Rosenberg’s rear guard re-joined Suvorov, the march 
to the Rhine began. The French vigorously pursued the Russians inflict-
ing such heavy casualties on their rear guard commanded by Bagration 
that its remnants could barely re-join the main forces without being anni-
hilated; they even had to abandon a chest with 30,000 francs.86 This fight-
ing retreat, according to Weyrother, shattered the morale of the Russians, 
who were already shaken by fatigue, the failure to break though at Näfels, 
and the privations suffered in the unfamiliar mountain environment.87 
83 Suvorov to Archduke Carl (7 October 1799) – Istorija, Fuchs, vol. 3, 354; Miljutin, Istorija, 
vol. 3, 521.
84 Suvorov does not say a word about the battle at Näfels in his report to Tsar Paul, instead 
presenting his campaign as a series of brilliant victories, although he even contemplated retreat 
back to Italy, which would have been an admission of total failure, Suvorov, “Donesenie Suvo-
rova,” 388–422.
85 Miljutin, Istorija, vol. 2, 302; Bogdanovič, Poxody Suvorova, 183.
86 Grjazev, “Poxod Suvorova,” 218; von Reding-Biberegg, Poxod Suvorova, 125.
87 Duffy, Eagles, 248.
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By this time, the boots of most Russian soldiers were so worn down 
from the rocky trails that their officers and later observers referred to 
Suvorov’s army as “mostly barefoot”, which, while perhaps an exaggera-
tion, still testifies to the poor shape of their footwear.88 General Rehbinder 
wore boots without soles; he cut parts of his overcoat and wrapped them 
around his feet, as did many soldiers,89 while others took boots from 
1,400 French prisoners90 whom they convoyed across the Pragel and 
Panix passes, leaving them barefoot. The Russians imposed a contribu-
tion of 700 pairs of boots on a Swiss town, and when the residents failed 
to deliver the boots, the soldiers pulled them from their feet.91 In addi-
tion, the soldiers were weakened by malnourishment: for several days, 
they had their rations cut to one-quarter of the regular ration.92 
On 6 October, this barefoot, starving army began climbing Panix. A 
trail leading to the pass was covered with fresh snow that was half a metre 
deep.93 Most of Suvorov’s army had avoided snow so far; only the rear 
guard had crossed small patches of fresh snow at Chinzig Chulm and 
Pragel.94 At Panix, however, the deep snow had a grave impact on the out-
come of the trek. The path was hard to find because it climbed side cliffs 
instead of following the bottom of the valley, and the fresh snow obscured 
the steepness of the slopes. Thick clouds and blizzards obstructed the 
view.95 
Russian authors call this trek “Golgotha”.96 Suvorov summarised his 
impressions of the Panix crossing: “No description would be able to ren-
der the horrors of nature. The sheer memory of it torments our souls.”97 
88 Suvorov to Rastopčin (13 October 1799) – Istorija, Fuchs, vol. 3, 387; Grjazev, “Poxod Suvo-
rova,” 205; Clausewitz, Švejcarskij poxod, 118, 132; Lopatin, Suvorov, 519; Petruševskij, Gene-
ralissimus, 585.
89 Starkov, Rasskazy, vol. 2, 251; Grjazev, “Poxod Suvorova,” 205.
90 Longworth, The Art of Victory, 288.
91 von Reding-Biberegg, Poxod Suvorova, 68, 108, 139.
92 Starkov, Rasskazy, vol. 2, 254.
93 Grjazev, “Poxod Suvorova,” 219.
94 von Reding-Biberegg, Poxod Suvorova, 72; Duffy, Eagles, 242, 252.
95 Miljutin, Istorija, vol. 2, 305; Bogdanovič, Poxody Suvorova, 186.
96 A. Kersnovskij (А. Керсновский), Istorija russkoj armii (История русской армии) (Mos-
cow: Golos, 1993), v.1, 191.
97 Suvorov, “Donesenie Suvorova,” 390.
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The army began its single-file ascent along the northern slope of the pass 
at 4:00 a.m. and spent the whole day climbing to its top through the thin-
ning air. Grjazev described how the soldiers marched “along a very nar-
row icy path that leaned towards the yawning abyss, where a careless or 
false step could lead to a [deadly] plunge, which is what happened to 
some”. They had to gather all their courage “to defeat the elements, the 
most terrifying and merciless enemy”. 
[The soldiers] were in quite a deplorable state, and this horrific sight 
caused utmost sorrow. Our entire army and regiments mixed together; 
each man walked where he chose, … the weakest fell and paid the ulti-
mate price to the elements; those who wanted to rest sat down and fell 
into eternal sleep; those who walked had to struggle against a bitterly 
cold wind with freezing rain that covered them with ice. Almost frozen, 
we could barely move and fought for our lives. There was no shelter or 
even a piece of wood to make a fire and warm up our frozen limbs. … 
We threw away or lost everything we carried, even the weapons – the 
primary protection of a soldier. Everyone looked out only for himself; 
nobody commanded, and the discipline collapsed.98 
By evening, only the vanguard had crossed the pass; the rest had to spend 
the night at the pass above treeline, battered by a blizzard.99 As Bargation 
recalled, “The mud and snow were our bed, and the sky showering us with 
snow and rain was our blanket.”100 When soldiers began freezing, their 
commanders allowed them to make fires from Cossack spears and the 
carriages of mountain guns; the guns themselves had to be thrown into 
an abyss. Thus, Suvorov lost all the artillery with which he had started the 
march.101
The descent from the pass was even more difficult than the ascent, 
with high vertical cliffs blocking the entire valley. Although the path 
climbed around the cliffs, the snow had obliterated it. The steep slope, 
covered with a snow crust, was slippery. Only half of the mules had sur-
98 Grjazev, “Poxod Suvorova,” 219–221.
99 Miljutin, Istorija, vol. 2, 305.
100 Starkov, Rasskaz, vol. 2, 221.
101 Miljutin, Istorija, vol. 2, 305.
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vived the march to Panix,102 and even those who had come through had 
lost their horseshoes and could not negotiate the icy slopes. The soldiers 
had to push them down the cliff one by one, hoping that at least some 
would survive; most did not.103 When Grjazev finally descended to the 
forest, “soaking wet and covered with mud, totally exhausted and tor-
mented by sorrow, I fell on the wet moss, but a terrible cold shook my 
whole body and forced me to jump up.”104 Sergeant Jakov Starkov believed 
that the crossing of Panix was more horrific than any battle of the Swiss 
campaign: “Those damn mountains gave us hell! They tormented us 
nearly to death.”105 Even a century after the Swiss campaign, the residents 
of the Panix village located at the southern foot of the pass recounted 
how the descending Russian mob took all the food and cattle they could 
find, tore clothes and boots from the villagers, and burned down all the 
fences and wooden roofs to warm themselves up.106 During the Panix 
trek, Suvorov lost over 200 men through freezing to death or slipping 
into the abyss. Many more were frostbitten and sick from hypothermia, 
and about 100 soldiers experienced temporary snow blindness.107 Hav-
ing crossed Panix into the Rhine valley, Suvorov effectively removed 
his army from Switzerland, leaving the country to the French. Tsar Paul 
ordered the return of Suvorov’s army to Russia.108 This was the end of the 
Swiss campaign, which lasted 17 days, from 21 September to 7 October. 
During this time, the Russian Army covered 270 kilometres across four 
mountain passes.
Although Suvorov won a number of victories during the Swiss cam-
paign, this happened in part because the Russians outnumbered or 
matched the opposing French forces in all the engagements, except the 
battle of Rosenberg’s rear guard at the Muota. In the assaults on St. Gott-
hard, Oberalp, and Teufelsbrücke and in the small clash at Altdorf, the 
102 Miljutin, Istorija, vol. 2, 298.
103 Grjazev, “Poxod Suvorova,” 219.
104 Ibid., 222.
105 Starkov, Rasskazy, vol. 2, 255.
106 Lopatin, Suvorov, 520.
107 Clausewitz, Švejcarskij poxod, 133; Duffy, Eagles, 258.
108 Paul I to Suvorov (7 October 1799) – Istorija, Fuchs, vol. 3, 360.
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Russians grossly outnumbered the enemy, and in the battle at Klöntaler 
Lake, they still had more men than the French, although the French had a 
better artillery. Suvorov’s army suffered grave attrition, both from combat 
and from exposure during treks across the Alps. Suvorov maintained that 
by the end of the campaign, he had retained only about 11,500 uninjured 
soldiers, or half of those with whom he began the campaign.109 In addi-
tion to the heavy personnel casualties, Suvorov also lost all his mountain 
artillery, most horses and mules, and many hand weapons. The French 
assessed their casualties during the 15 days of the Swiss campaign – 
including the actions against Korsakov, Hotze, and Auffenberg – as 6,000 
men killed, wounded, or taken prisoner.110 This number might exclude 
the sick, but even so, it is clear that in the Alps, the French lost fewer 
 soldiers in actions against Suvorov than he did. 
Most non-Russian scholars, and a small minority of Russian histo-
rians assess Suvorov’s campaign in Switzerland as a failure111 but main-
tain that he escaped annihilation because of his and his generals’ talented 
leadership and the impressive combat skills of his personnel. Suvorov’s 
bombastic reports of glorious victories that he sent to Tsar Paul112 did 
not obscure the fact that the Swiss campaign failed to attain its goal – the 
expulsion of the French from Switzerland. On the contrary, the French 
crushed Korsakov and Hotze and soon occupied the entire country. Suvo-
rov escaped destruction but suffered so many casualties that, in the words 
of Clausewitz, they “equalled those in a lost battle”.113 
109 Suvorov wrote on 13 and 14 October that he had only 10,000 able-bodied men, “barefoot 
and naked”, which did not include Cossacks, Suvorov to Rastopčin (13 October 1799) – Istorija, 
Fuchs, vol. 3, 387; Miljutin, Istorija, vol. 2, 323. A lieutenant-colonel of the Russian General 
Staff calculated that less than 1,500 Cossacks remained able-bodied, Bogdanovič, Poxody Suvo-
rova, 187.
110 Miljutin, Istorija, vol. 3, 526.
111 For instance, Blanning, The French Revolutionary Wars, 253; Phipps, The Armies of the First 
French Republic, vol.  5, 157; Clausewitz, Švejcarskij poxod, 133, 134; Petruševskij, Generalis-
simus, 604; Miljutin, Istorija vojny, vol. 2, 307.
112 They included the misinformation that Suvorov had taken General Lecourbe prisoner, 
Suvo rov to Emperor Franz II (11 October 1799) – Istorija, Fuchs, vol. 3, 382. This misinforma-
tion was later repeated by many Russian historians as a fact, Leščinskij, “Ital’janskij i Švejcarskij 
poxody,” 129; Al’tgovzen, “Polkovodčeskoe iskusstvo,” 129; Šišov, Suvorov, 411.
113 Clausewitz, Švejcarskij poxod, 133.
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Scholars of the Swiss campaign put forward two reasons for its failure: 
flawed strategy and the mistaken choice of route across the Alps. Clause-
witz believed that the campaign was doomed from the outset because it 
presumed coherent actions of several large formations spread over great 
distances with messengers as the only means of communication; these 
formations belonged to two allied armies with different cultures, politi-
cal goals, and strategic priorities. He called the whole idea of the cam-
paign “a giant mistake. Its failure was the result of the strategy on which 
it was based, and even if no mistakes and no unfortunate incidents had 
occurred during its implementation, the result could not have been much 
better. … The fact that this campaign did not lead to an even worse out-
come and a complete disaster was due to the courage of the Russians and 
the grave mistakes committed by the French.”114 
As for the route across the Alps, it is easy to see, in retrospect, that 
Suvorov’s major mistake was the choice of the St. Gotthard trail instead 
of the roads via St. Bernardino Pass or Como Lake and Tyrol, where no 
French forces were deployed. His slow supply train and artillery, which 
followed what was believed to be a much longer Como Lake route, reached 
the Rhine well ahead of Suvorov’s army, with no problems encountered 
on the way.115 Genrikh Leer, a major nineteenth-century Russian mili-
tary thinker, called the choice of route via St. Gotthard “a grave strategic 
error”.116 While Suvorov later admitted that the choice of route was erro-
neous, he habitually blamed the Austrians for allegedly suggesting it.117 
Before the start of the campaign, however, he stated that he opted for that 
route because it allowed him to “go straight to the enemy and engage his 
weakest positions instead of losing time in a timid effort to join forces via 
114 Clausewitz, Švejcarskij poxod, 149, 150.
115 von Reding-Biberegg, Poxod Suvorova, 112.
116 Orlov, Poxod Suvorova, 82.
117 Petruševskij, Generalissimus, 566. Most Russian historians supported this thesis, and some 
even interpreted the alleged Austrian advice as treason, Miljutin, Istorija, vol. 3, 477; Lopatin, 
Suvo rov, 730. These accusations are groundless: first, von Reding states that Suvorov chose the 
St. Gotthard route against the initial advice of the Austrians, who suggested the way via San 
Bernardino; second, as Petruševskij observes, “One cannot attribute perfidy or ill will [to the 
Austrians] because Suvorov’s failure … directly hampered their own strategy,” von Reding-
Biberegg, Poxod Suvorova, 20; Petruševskij, Generalissimus, 566.
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long detours.”118 Being inexperienced in mountain warfare, Suvorov, in 
Petruševskij’s words, “erroneously took long for short and complicated 
for simple”119 and failed to consider many problems that must have been 
anticipated. He gravely underestimated the mountain combat skills of the 
French, as well as the difficulty of marching in the fall season and the 
potential logistical challenges.120 The plan to march via St. Gotthard was 
Suvorov’s brainchild, and, as Leer observes, no alleged mistakes of the 
Austrians “acquit Suvorov: whether the general acts according to his own 
plan or that suggested by someone else, glory in the case of success and 
blame in the case of failure are laid at his feet alone, because it was he who 
was responsible for its implementation.”121 
Nonetheless, even those authors who call the Swiss campaign an 
unqualified failure pay tribute to the actions of the Russian generals and 
soldiers who did everything possible to mitigate the dire consequences 
of a flawed strategy, showing tactical excellence and great endurance.122 
According to Clausewitz, “If the actual outcome of Suvorov’s campaign 
was more a defeat than victory, in terms of morale it was more a victory 
than a defeat.” The Russian soldiers “must have perceived this trek as a 
raging torrent that swept away all the dams built by the enemy, … and the 
destruction of any such dam as a victory.”123 Clausewitz’s conclusions are 
supported by a choir of Russian authors claiming that “this failed cam-
paign brought more glory than the most brilliant victory.”124 As one of 
them put it, “The Leuthen campaign of Frederick II was elegant; Napo-
leon’s Italian campaign was brilliant; Suvorov’s Swiss campaign earned 
eternal glory. No nation and no army have ever gained such a stunning 
victory of morale over the elements.”125 Miljutin argues that “the Swiss 
campaign was actually the zenith of Suvorov’s military glory”,126 and 
118 Suvorov to Hotze (13 September 1799) – Istorija, Fuchs, vol. 3, 290.
119 Petruševskij, Generalissimus, 565. 
120 Miljutin, Istorija, vol. 2, 308; von Reding-Biberegg, Poxod Suvorova, 22.
121 Orlov, Poxod Suvorova, 83.
122 Petruševskij, Generalissimus, 604.
123 Clausewitz, Švejcarskij poxod, 133, 134.
124 Miljutin, Istorija, vol. 2, 307.
125 Kersnovskij, Istorija russkoj armii, 1, 192.
126 Miljutin, Istorija, vol. 2, 309.
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many authors cite Masséna’s apocryphal phrase: “I would have exchanged 
all my 42 campaigns for Suvorov’s campaign in Switzerland.”127 The dar-
ing trek across the Alps has stuck in Russian historical memory, and the 
emphasis on glory has eclipsed its ultimate strategic failure.
Conclusion: Lessons of the Swiss campaign
In terms of strategy, the Swiss campaign showed that the margin of error 
is inevitably narrower in the mountains than on the plains. The Alpine 
trek was an impromptu action, and this was the major reason for its 
 failure. Strategy should be simple in the mountains because communica-
tion and logistical problems frustrate the coherent actions of large forma-
tions scattered at great distances, but it is hard to make it simple because 
the landscape inevitably splits the armies, and the weather complicates 
things by adding surprises in addition to those prepared by the enemy. 
It is easier to surprise and be surprised in the mountains than on the 
plains because the landscape impedes intelligence acquisition and con-
ceals manoeuvres: Suvorov’s army achieved a complete surprise at the 
approaches to St. Gotthard, Oberalp, and Chinzig Chulm, and the French 
failed to stop them at any of these excellent defensive positions. But poor 
weather can disable more men than enemy actions, as Suvorov learned 
when he calculated the total casualties suffered by his army. Therefore, 
a serious effort must be invested into the detailed study of a potential 
mountain operational theatre, including its mapping and the analysis of 
its climate, before the beginning of the campaign in order to thin “the fog 
of uncertainty”, mitigate the weather factor, and avoid shocking discover-
ies of the sort that awaited Suvorov at Lake Lucerne when he found no 
road to Schwyz. Commanders must be flexible enough to adjust not just 
their tactics but even their strategic plans to realities they had failed to 
foresee, as Suvorov did in the Muota valley when he completely changed 
127 Beskrovnyj, “Strategija,” 39; Al’tgovzen, “Polkovodčeskoe iskusstvo,” 151; Šatagin, “Velikij 
russkij polkovodec,” 25; Orlov, Poxod Suvorova, 82. No historian references this alleged phrase 
of Masséna.
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the direction of his march; therefore, even strategic decisions should be 
made by senior field commanders rather than by their General Staff supe-
riors, who are far away and have no adequate picture of either the envi-
ronment in which their soldiers operate or their morale. Since operations 
in the mountains presume more physical discomfort than those on the 
plains, and poor weather has graver consequences, a special effort must 
be made to maintain soldiers’ morale. Furthermore, as Suvorov found 
out, the mountain environment alone, even in the absence of enemies, 
distressed professional Russian soldiers; this suggests that units operat-
ing in the mountains should ideally be raised from residents of mountain 
regions accustomed to such an environment. 
As for tactical lessons, the Swiss campaign showed that numerical 
superiority brings fewer benefits in the mountains than on the plains 
because the mountain landscape often prohibits the concentration of 
the available units at a certain point and may help a handful of soldiers 
to pin down a far superior force. Consequently, high mobility and tacti-
cal manoeuvres, such as the envelopments undertaken by the Russians 
during the assault on St. Gotthard and Oberalp and at Teufelsbrücke, 
at the Mouta and Klöntaler Lake, are a must during an assault on well-
entrenched enemy positions, notwithstanding the frequent failures of 
such manoeuvres due to impassable terrain. Since both sides understand 
that the mountain landscape can greatly enhance their strength, it is vital 
to promptly occupy good positions before the enemy does. Furthermore, 
as Clausewitz observed after studying the Swiss campaign, “Mountain 
warfare leads to atomisation of military formations; their various ele-
ments often fight on their own, which means they have to take initia-
tive. This is true for both … generals and … every private.”128 Infantry 
must learn the special tactics of mountain warfare, and the individual 
training of a soldier fighting in the mountains must be more diverse 
than that of his counterpart operating on the plains. Those who plan to 
fight in the mountains have to train their manpower in a mountain envi-
ronment to smooth the “friction of war”. Infantry should be backed by 
mountain artillery, which, although inevitably inferior to regular field 
128 Clausewitz, Švejcarskij poxod, 243.
63The Alpine Campaign of 1799 as a Stepping Stone to a Doctrine of Mountain Warfare
guns, is still able to provide adequate support in a terrain prohibitive 
for regular cannons. 
Logistics is often the focal point of mountain warfare, and the General 
Staff has to be able to foresee what soldiers can and cannot do in a certain 
season, given the topography on which they operate. Logistical problems 
are enormous: marches are slow and exhausting; a shorter but steeper trail 
often takes more time than a longer but gently sloped one. The scarcity 
of population in the mountains makes it difficult to live off the land or 
find accommodation; therefore, soldiers should carry with them tents and 
food. Since every additional kilo in the knapsack increases fatigue, and the 
attrition of supply trains is great, a large extra number of pack animals, 
packs, and horseshoes must be accumulated before the beginning of the 
campaign. Suvorov’s treks across Chinzig Chulm and Panix showed that 
circumstances frequently force soldiers to spend nights above treeline, 
where they are exposed to cold, bitter winds and possibly blizzards; conse-
quently, they need warm uniforms to survive in such conditions. They also 
need sturdier boots than usual. Even if soldiers are dressed appropriately, 
the mountain environment guarantees that casualties from non-combat 
causes – disease, frostbite, and injury – will be considerably higher per 
capita in the mountains than on the plains, and while the number of casu-
alties inflicted by enemy fire will probably be smaller, the transportation 
of the injured and sick will be an acute problem; their abandonment at the 
mercy of the enemy can ruin the morale of able-bodied soldiers. Conse-
quently, means of transportation of the injured have to be developed, and 
a sufficient numbers of pack animals and soldiers must be allotted to this 
task. The convoying and feeding of POWs increases the severe logistical 
strain, and commanders have few options as to how to tackle this mat-
ter. Failure to anticipate all these problems and find viable solutions may 
cause far graver repercussions in the mountains than on the plains.
Finally, those who study historical experience in order to draw lessons 
for future actions should read the accounts of past campaigns with a criti-
cal eye, keeping in mind that battles in the austere but beautiful mountain 
environment provoke more romantic tales than do engagements on the 
plains. These tales should be identified as such and filtered so that they do 
not obscure the actual problems. 
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These lessons would have been relevant to every subsequent cam-
paign that Russia fought in the mountains and could have helped the gen-
erals planning actions in such battle environment, had they learned these 
lessons. However, since mountains were on the verges of Russia and away 
from the military theatres perceived as most probable, its generals consis-
tently neglected the experiences of their predecessors in such terrain and 
retained a haphazard approach to mountain warfare. That is why Rus-
sia’s actions in the mountains were usually marked by high casualty rates 
from non-combat causes and embarrassing reversals, despite substantial 
superiority in firepower and numbers over enemy skilled in mountain 
warfare. This happened during the counterinsurgency in the Caucasus 
in 1817–1864, the war against the Ottoman Empire in 1877–1878 in 
the  Balkans, the campaign in the Carpathians during World War I, the 
defence of the Caucasus in 1942, the breakthrough across the Carpa-
thians in 1944, and the fight against Islamic guerrillas in Afghanistan in 
1979–1789 and Chechen separatists in 1994–1996.
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